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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
into interstate commerce, if the drugs should subsequently be misbranded,
even as long as 18 months later, while being held for sale.a1
The minority suggestion that Section 301 (k) rather than Section 301 (a)
should have been applied to the separate shipments is questionable. As the
Court pointed out, Section 301 (k) does not reach situations where the
manufacturer sells directly to the consumer. In addition, it does not apply
to the shipper who first sends literature, and then the drugs, as was the
situation in several of the shipments in the instant case. 14 Moreover, even the
dissenting opinion still leaves doubt as to the line of cleavage between Section
301 (a) and Section 301 (k), since the drugs and literature were shipped only
two days apart in one of the separate shipments.' 5
The Court's holding, on the other hand, is unmistakable. No apparent
hiatus remains in the Act.

TORTS-DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER BY RADIO
Plaintiff alleged defamation of his character arising from a radio speech
made by defendant Hoffman while using the facilities of defendant Trent
Broadcasting Corporation. Plaintiff appealed from an order declaring that
his bill did not state a cause of action against Trent Broadcasting Corporation.
Held, reversing the lower court, that plaintiff's declaration sufficiently stated
a cause of action against defendant broadcasting corporation based on negligence, and an action for defamation of character by radio woild lie. The dissenting judge argued that liability should be based on the absolute liability
doctrine. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143 (N.J. 1948).
The instant case demonstrates the confusion existing witli regard to the
liability of a radio broadcasting company for defamation made by another
while using its facilities. This conflict exists partially because the courts are
not in accord as to what constitutes libel 1 or slander 2 with regard to radio
broadcasts; however, this distinction is not of importance in the present case
as the broadcasted matter was held actionable per se.
13. One of the shipments in question involved laxative tablets, bearing statutorily

adequate labels. They were shipped on July 10, 1942. The mislabeling came through
literature shipped to the same consignee on January 18, 1944, over 18 months later. It
was not claimed that anyone had been harmed by the tablets, but evidence was given that
the booklets contained false staterents concerning their efficacy.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the dissenting opinion is silent as to the
facts in the remaining twelve shipments. In these shipments the time span between drug
and literature shipment dates varied from two to 184 days.
14. See Record, pp. 432,438, containing table showing dates of shipment Brief for
Appellees, pp. 4, 5.
15. See note 13 supro.

1. Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (libel is a statement
made in some permanent, visible form. Visibility of the writing is not necessary when the
defamatory matter is so widespread and has been disseminated to such a large number of
people that it takes on the characteristic of permanence). See Note, 171 A.L.R. 765 (1947).
2. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937) (slander is a statement in
spoken words or other transitory form. Words transmitted over the air waves do not have

CASES NOTED
The earliest cases regarding radio defamation 3 were based on the doctrine of absolute liability. This doctrine was disregarded in a Pennsylvania
case 4 which held that the radio station's liability must be based on negligence.
In the earlier cases the defamatory statements were made from previously
prepared scripts, while in the Summit case the statements were made extemporaneously.
Though the court in this case relies on the Summit case 5 it is distinguishable. Here, the statement was read from a prepared manuscript which defendant broadcasting company had an opportunity to examine, while in the
former case the actionable statement was "ad libbed." The "ad libbing" cases
have been decided on the basis of negligence,6 and these holdings are approved
by a leading text writer on radio defamation. 7 These cases should be differentiated from those imposing an absolute liability when the statement is made
from a previously prepared script. 8
When the script is available for inspection, as in the present case, most
courts agree that the radio station should assume absolute liabilityY This result is reached by drawing an analogy between a radio station and a newspaper.' IrP the "ad libbing" cases a1 it is reasonable to base the liability on
2
negligence since "ad libbing" is difficult for the radio station to control.'
Some jurisdictions have settled this conflict by legislative action.' 3 However, in the absence of such legislation the"courts should not impose the
negligence doctrine in the prepared script situation..As the dissent stated, the
absence of statutory restriction should not prevent a proper balancing of all
the interests. The fact that the radio station knew of the defamatory matter
and failed to take any action to prevent its broadcast should be considered in
the light of the present harm inflicted on an innocent member of the public.
In such a situation it would seem that the broadcasting station in effect has
approved the defamatory matter.
the permanence of a written statement, especially when they are extemporaneous interpolations).
3. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932)
Miles v. Louis Wasmer,
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) ; Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp.

889 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
4. Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
5. See note 4 supra.
6. Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985
(1942); Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, Locke v. Gibbons, 164
Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937).

7. 2 SocoLow,

LAW OF

ADIo BROADCASTING

§§ 476, 477 (1939).

8. See note 3 supra.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. Notes, 17 ORE. L. REv. 307 (1938) ; 38 Micu. L. REv. 415 (1940) ; 26 A.B.A.J. 490
(1940) (radio stations compete vigorously with newspapers for advertising; have the
same opportunity to check manuscripts; may indemnify themselves against loss by increase
in advertising charges; disseminate to a large group of people; and their effect is just as
permanent).
I1. See note 6 supra.
12. See Note, 124 A.L.R. 982 (1940).
13. FLA. STAT. § 770.04 (1947) (no owner or licensor of a radio station shall be
liable for damages for any defamatory statement uttered over its facilities unless the
complaining party proves negligence on the part of the owner or licensor).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Here, the court in deciding in favor of lessor liability cited as authority a
case which had entirely different facts and created a completely separate problem. Query, what effect will the instant case have on future litigation? It appears that the New Jersey court has misapplied the negligence doctrine in
this instance in applying it to a prepared script case when its rationale is limited
to "ad libbing" situations. It would seem that the distinction is a valid one
and that it should be maintained.
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-EFFECT OF
CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE
Administratrix brought an action under a wrongful death statute for
damages resulting from the negligent killing of deceased. Deceised had parked
his truck so that it protruded upon a highway in violation of a state statute.
While he was under the truck, it was negligently hit by defendant, killing deceased. Held, that the contributory negligence of deceased bars the action
of his administratrix. Haase v. Willers Truck Service, 34 N.W.2d 313
(S.D. 1948).
The court commented that if the plaintiff had asserted that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, and was therefore liable, the
plaintiff still could not have recovered because of the deceased's continuing
negligence. The dissent maintained that the deceased's continuing negligence
would not have prevented the assertion of the last clear chance doctrine by the
plaintiff because such continuing negligence was of a passive nature.
Where a defendant seeks to avoid liability for his negligent injury to the
plaintiff by proving contributory negligence, the plaintiff usually asserts that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury and is, therefore,
liable under the last clear chance doctrine. Where the defendant actually sees
the perilous situation in which the plaintiff has involved himself by his contributory negligence in time to avoid the injury, it is generally held that the
defendant has the last clear chance to avoid the accident even though the
plaintiff is physically able to extricate himself from the perilous situation but,
through his own inattentiveness, fails to do so.' In those situations where
the defendant did not actually discover the peril of the plantiff but, by the
use of reasonable care, ought to have discovered such peril, it is generally
agreed that the defendant will be held to have had the last clear chance to
avoid the injury if the plaintiff was physically unable to extricate himself
from the perilous situation.3
If, however, the plaintiff was physically able to extricate himself from
the situation of peril which he created by his own contributory negligence,
1. Merchant's Transport Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933) ; See Note,

92 A.LR. 83, 86 (1934).

.2. Merchant's Transport Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933); Dunn Bus
Service v. McKinley; 130:Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).

